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THE LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS VALUES IN
JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING
SCOTt C. IDLEMAN*
Judge Wendell Griffen, in The Case for Religious Values in Judicial
Decision-Making,' has thoughtfully and forcefully explained why
religious considerations ought not to be excluded from the decisional
processes of judges. Articulated at relatively general level, his
normative thesis strikes this author as compelling, and he is surely
correct to look with wariness upon the idea that religious values should
or can be categorically banished from judicial decisionmaking.2 Yet
sometimes the devil can be in the details, so to speak, and the initial
force of a thesis may diminish once its terms and scope are more
thoroughly developed and more carefully examined. The concern here
is that while Judge Griffen has given us much in the way of a general
outline, and has even fleshed out certain aspects of his thesis, there
remain important details which necessarily invite both further
development and further scrutiny!
Accordingly, rather than directly critique Judge Griffen's
presentation, these comments will attempt to build upon his basic
normative position by addressing some of these points of detail. Two
matters, in particular, will be explored. First, what foundational
premises ought to inform the use of religious values by judges-what is
the meaning of religion, for example, or what is the nature of the
* Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School. I would like to thank my
fellow panel members-Professor Daniel 0. Conlde, the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall, and,
of course, the Honorable Wendell L. Griffen-for their insightful contributions to this topic;
Martha Hollingsworth, Elizabeth Staton Idleman, Lee and Sue Idleman, Daniel P. Meyer,
and the Honorable Robert H. Staton for their steadfast encouragement of this conference;
Jacques Condon for his superb research assistance; and the Lilly Endowment and Dean
Howard B. Eisenberg of the Marquette University Law School for their generous financial
and institutional support, without which this conference would not have been possible.
1. Wendell L. Griffen, The Case for Religious Values in Judicial Decision-Making, 81
MARQ. L. REv. 513 (1998).
2. In fact, his position is substantially congruent with my own. See Scott C. Idleman,
Note, The Role of Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making, 68 IND. LJ. 433 (1993).
3. Professor Daniel Conkle, for example, has suggested that Judge Griffen's most
important points, though quite agreeable in the abstract, cannot possibly be applied without
qualification. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Religiously Devout Judges: Issues of Personal Integrity
and Public Benefit, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 523 (1998).
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judicial decisional process? Second, what are the operative limits on
the judicial use of religious values-what are the constraints imposed by
the federal Constitution, for example, or by our political-philosophical
commitments or by various prudential considerations? It is this
author's motivating aspiration that, by addressing questions such as
these, the judicial use of religious values might attain the coherence and
legitimacy that are necessary to render this use meaningful.
I. FOUNDATIONAL PREMISES
Conceptualization and definition are critical processes within the
American system of law and legal reasoning, in large part because that
system relies heavily upon the manipulation of cultural and linguistic
materials.! At any given place and time, there will obviously be
contextual limits on the capacity of legal thinkers to advance certain
interpretations of concepts or terms. Religious values, for example, do
not include a preference for grapefruit over honeydew melon; nor is it
thought that the judicial reasoning process should entail the reading of
tarot cards. The potential for divergent interpretation remains
substantial, however, particularly given that the interpretive process
may itself alter the status of the concepts or terms interpreted. Surely
this potential for interpretive divergence is relevant to the role of
religious values in judicial decisionmaking, and much of the
disagreement over their role is likely traceable to antecedent
disagreement over various conceptual or definitional aspects of the
inquiry.
At the very least, then, an analysis of the role of religion in judging
warrants the consideration of three foundational premises-one
definitional, one conceptual, and one empirical. The definitional
premise concerns the meaning of religion, or of religious values. The
conceptual premise concerns the nature of judicial decisionmaking or,
more generally, of the judicial process. And the empirical premise
concerns the reality of religion's place within the actual world of
judging, that is, whether and to what extent judges necessarily rely on
religious values as a matter of fact. Each of these will be addressed in
order.
4. See generally DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW (1963).
5. Cf generally Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What
Lawyers Can Learn from Modem Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989).
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A. The Definition of Religion or Religious Values
It should virtually go without saying that the definition of religion is
one of the most important analytical starting points, and yet within the
literature on the role of religion in law or politics there is relatively little
treatment of the issue.6 Whether inadvertent or not, such avoidance is
certainly explicable given the large intellectual cost involved, the
correlated lack of expectation by many readers that the definitional
question need be treated, and the seemingly small marginal benefit that
might result from treatment of the question. But the question-which,
after all, may be the definitive threshold inquiry-is far too significant
to avoid.
Generating much of this significance is the simple fact that, the
broader one's definition of religion or religious values, the greater the
consequences of either allowing or disallowing judges to invoke
religious values in their decisionmaking. And generating much of the
salience of the inquiry is the fact that our legal system has already
adopted a relatively generous definition in various statutory and
constitutional' contexts-and that, from the perspectives of some
6. Importantly, Judge Griffen is an exception. At one point in his article, for example,
he employs the theology of Paul Tillich in broadly conceptualizing the meaning of religious
values. See Griffen, supra note 1, at 515 & n.11 (citing PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC
THEOLOGY 11-15 (1967)). Another notable exception, drawn from the same conference, is
Mark Modak-Truran, The Religious Dimension of Judicial Decision Making and the De Facto
Disestablishment, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 255, 262-63 (1998) (discussing SCHUBERT M. OGDEN,
Is THERE ONLY ONE TRUE RELIGION OR ARE THERE MANY? 5-7 (1992)).
7. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (holding that "[a] sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by
the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption" is sufficient to satisfy the
conscientious objection exemption to the federal conscription statute, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j)
(1996)); see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (expanding on the Seeger
approach under the federal conscription statute); United States v. Levy, 419 F.2d 360, 365
(8th Cir. 1969) (adopting the Seeger approach under the federal conscription statute); United
States v. Haughton, 413 F.2d 736, 739-42 (9th Cir. 1969); Decker v. Wheeler, 331 F. Supp.
347, 349-50 (D. Minn. 1970); Thomas v. Salatich, 328 F. Supp. 18, 21-22 (E.D. La. 1971);
Weber v. Inacker, 317 F. Supp. 651, 656-57 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Although these are not
constitutional interpretations, see United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1500 (D. Wyo.
1995) (concluding that the functional approach invoked in the Selective Service Act cases
does not carry over into the constitutional realm) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
216 (1972)), aff'd, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996), they may have constitutional significance to
the extent that the Court's broad construction was ultimately necessary to avoid a problem
under the Establishment Clause. See Jesse H. Choper, Congressional Power To Expand
Judicial Definitions of the Substantive Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REv.
299,336-37 (1982).
8. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 440
(2d Cir. 1981) (employing, in part, an ultimate concern approach in the free exercise
context); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197,207-08 (3d Cir. 1979) (employing, in part, an ultimate
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observers, even this definition is not sufficiently encompassing.! The
now-classic example of this broadened definition is known typically as
the functional or parallel belief analysis: "'[r]eligious beliefs' ... are
those that stem from a person's 'moral, ethical, or religious beliefs
about what is right and wrong' and are 'held with the strength of
traditional religious convictions."" 10  Under such an analysis even
"secular humanism," that foe of many religious traditionalists, could be
religious in some legal sense."
It is conceivable, of course, that this broad definition of religion
need not be imported into the judicial decisionmaking context. It does
bear noting, however, that some of the same considerations that might
lead one to be concerned about the judicial use of religious values-a
commitment to certain rule of law tenets, to the secular nature of
government, and to the need for pluralistic inclusion-could very well
compel one to embrace the broad definition crafted in these statutory
and constitutional contexts. In turn, unless we can distinguish in a
principled way these other cases and contexts from the judicial use of
religious values, we ought to be extremely reluctant to advocate
restricting such use outright, lest the breadth of our definition might
cause the judicial process either to be stripped of all meaningful moral
influence or (more likely) to degenerate into a medium in which
religious values are simply invoked in an ad hoc and selective manner.
Not only is it important, then, to address the definition of religion,
but the demands of consistency may make this an ideologically
unpalatable task. And the unpalatability, perhaps fortunately, is not
confined to just one end of the ideological spectrum. In terms of the
traditionalist advocate who, for example, attempts to expunge from
public education the influences of, say, witchcraft, by labeling such
influences as religious and thereby invoking the Establishment Clause,
12
concern approach in the establishment context).
9. See, e.g., Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Judging Religion, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 441 (1998).
10. United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970)). Professor Esbeck sums up the current definitional
approach as "broad and indeterminate, including naturalistic, nontheistic, and
anthropocentric religions." Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court's Law of
Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 581, 613
(1995) (footnote omitted).
11. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (recognizing "Secular
Humanism" as a religion); Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1534 (9th Cir.
1985) (stating that "[s]ecular humanism may be a religion"), cert denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985).
12. See, e.g., Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373, 1378 (9th Cir.
1994) (assuming for the purpose of analysis that Wicca is a religion).
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there may then be great difficulty in allowing the judicial use of only
those values that are religious in a traditional, narrow sense. Likewise,
in terms of the nontraditionalist advocate who, for example, attempts to
expand the meaning of religion under the Free Exercise Clause or Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act to protect, say, practitioners of witchcraft,13
there may be great difficulty in disallowing the judicial use of only those
values that are religious in a traditional, narrow sense. The point here,
of course, is not to disparage such ideological efforts, but simply to note
the problem of inconsistency that may arise by seeking both a broad
definition in one context and a narrow definition in another.14
B. The Conception of Judicial Decisionmaking
Less contentious perhaps than the meaning of religion, the second
foundational premise centers on the conceptualization of the judicial
process, for surely the propriety of adverting to religious values will
vary depending on the perceived nature of that process. One of the key
focal points of conceptualization in this regard concerns the function of
judicial reasoning, particularly as expressed through the written
opinion. The classic division, sometimes cast as the struggle between
formalism (or positivism) and realism,5 is whether the reasons
13. See, e.g., Van Koten v. Family Health Mgmt., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 898 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
Van Koten held that Wicca can be a religion under Title VII, relying in part on the broad,
functional definition of religion provided in the EEOC guidelines. See id; 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1
(1990) (Religion includes "moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are
sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views ... . The fact that no religious
group espouses such beliefs or the fact that the religious group to which the individual
professes to belong may not accept such belief will not determine whether the belief is a
religious belief of the employee."), cited in Van Koten, 955 F. Supp. at 902.
14. Regarding efforts to seek differential definitions between the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause, a presumptively questionable undertaking, see Esbeck, supra
note 10, at 589 & nn.25-26; Idleman, supra note 2, at 461 & n.92, 462 n.94. At least one
court, subordinating the principle of consistency to the imperative of practicality, has
accepted the differential approach. See Grove, 753 F.2d at 1537 ("To borrow the ultimate
concern test from the free exercise context and use it with present establishment clause
doctrines would be to invite attack on all programs that further the ultimate concerns of
individuals or entangle the government with such concerns.") (quoting Note, Toward a
Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1056, 1084 (1978)).
15. See Thomas C. Grey, Modem American Legal Thought, 106 YALE LJ. 493, 501
(1996) (reviewing NEIL DUXBURY, PATrERNs OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)).
Two clarifying points are in order here. First, positivism as such need not rely on a
deductive, explanatory model of judging-what is sometimes called "mechanical
jurisprudence"--although such a model does cohere nicely with the notion that judicial
decisions flow logically from positive law as applied to particular cases. See Anthony J.
Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2054 (1995) (distinguishing between
classical positivism and the formalism challenged by realism). Second, it would be
1998]
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expressed largely represent a pre-decisional process of deduction (thus
explained by the opinion) or whether they largely represent a post-
decisional process of rationalization (thus justified by the opinion). Do
judges, in other words, reach outcomes by their reasons, or do their
reasons merely buttress the outcomes that they have already reached by
some (undisclosed) intuitive process?"
Happily, there is no need in this limited medium to resolve the
question, which in any event is nothing more than a trite
oversimplification or caricature of the potential complexity of the
judicial process. 7 Rather, it is enough simply to highlight that the
proper role of religion in judging may vary enormously depending on
one's own resolution to this and related questions. If one accepts some
version of the explanatory model, for example, then the presumption
should be that religious values-to the extent they do in fact influence a
judge's decision-should have a place in the written opinion. This
presumption may possibly be overcome in special circumstances, but by
and large the omission of an influential variable runs directly contrary
to the explanatory, deductive model of judging. By comparison, if one
accepts some version of the justificatory model, wherein written
opinions are designed to rationalize a judge's outcome, then the place of
religious values--even if they do influence the judge's end result-may
be less certain. The idea of justification, after all, is not really to
disclose all influences in the decisional process, but rather to persuade
the audience that the outcome reached is defensible under the
governing sources of legal authority. In fact, given that religious bases
may be less than universal in their acceptance among the relevant
audiences to the opinion, it is quite sensible that the judge would not
misleading to think that a positivist would then embrace judicial use of religious values,
whether or not the judge could explain that they served as one link in a deductive chain. See
id. at 2063-64 (describing the potential discontinuity between law and morality as a
fundamental principle of classical legal positivism as formulated by Bentham and Austin);
see also H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1958).
16. See Daniel G. Ashburn, Appealing to a Higher Authority?: Jewish Law in American
Judicial Opinions, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 295, 297 n.6 (1994) ("[T]he question is often
whether the court's formal written opinion presents the actual reasoning behind a decision or
merely serves as an apologetic device meant to justify a result."). Professor Stephen Carter,
in an important article on religion and judicial decisionmaking, notes as well the significance
of the explanatory versus justificatory conception in relation to religion's inclusion in the
judicial process. See Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 932, 943 (1989).
17. For one perspective, see Jon 0. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral
Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 CAL. L. REV. 200 (1984).
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necessarily make reference to them in the act of justification.8
C. The Empirical Reality of Religion in Judging
The third foundational premise is empirical or descriptive and
concerns whether and to what extent religious values do in fact
influence the decisionmaking of judges, without regard to any
normative or theoretical formulations of that relationship. The
importance of this premise is obvious, as the worth of any model of
judging must in part be measured by its correspondence to actual
judicial practice. As Professor Greenawalt has observed: "[w]hat some
or most judges are doing does not ... determine what judges should be
doing ... [o]rdinarily a normative theory should not call for behavior
that is impossible or extremely difficult."' 9
What, then, is the basic empirical relationship between religion and
judging? For the recognizably religious judge, it would appear that
religious values often constitute an unavoidable source of insight and
authority,m although their use may not always be evident" and although
18. See Joan B. Gottschall, Response to Judge Wendell Griffen, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 533,
534-35 (1998) (explaining that judicial legitimacy, from the perspective of litigants, may be
undermined by decisionmaking that appears to rest on extralegal, judge-specific sources of
authority). This process of self-censorship may partly explain the omission of religion in
Professor Steven Smith's "fourth zone of disestablishment." See Steven D. Smith, Legal
Discourse and the De Facto Disestablishment, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 203, 211 (1998). Legal
academic discourse as well may be subject to this type of self-censorship, insofar as scholars,
too, would often like their work to be as widely accessible and widely influential as possible.
This is not to say, in either case, that religious references are truly inaccessible to any
reader-many such references arguably are not-but simply that readers might perceive
them as such and that judges and scholars, in turn, might acquiesce to these perceptions by
omitting these references from their works. On the related question of whether there is
actually an atmosphere of hostility toward religion in the academic setting, see Frederick M.
Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671, 671 n.2 (1992) (noting the
view that the "legal academy" may be hostile towards religion, and citing several works);
Peter Steinfels, Universities Biased Against Religion, Scholar Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26,
1993, at A22 (discussing perceived academic bias against "scholarship that reflects religious
viewpoints, especially traditional Christian ones").
19. Kent Greenawalt, The Perceived Authority of Law in Judging Constitutional Cases,
61 U. COLO. L. REV. 783, 786 (1990). That said, Professor Greenawalt is also careful to note
that "[t]he unavoidability of some influence does not settle ... the degree of influence, and
thus does not settle what judges should aim to do. Class prejudices and deep-seated personal
resentments will also affect judgment, but the judge should strive to discount or overcome
them." KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 144 (1995);
see also id at 149 ("To say that judges may sometimes have to use religious and other
personal convictions does not settle whether they should self-consciously do so.").
20. The influence of a judge's religious commitments may not always be confined to the
resolution of outcome-determinative, substantive questions of law. For example, such
commitments may affect: (1) a judge's disposition or perspective on authority, see James L,
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their relevance may only be apparent in situations where the positive
law is substantially underdeterminate or where the substance of the
dispute directly implicates fundamental or controversial ethical issues.2
To the extent such values may influence judges at a subconscious level,
as first principles paradigmatically do, this unavoidability may even
extend to those judges who deliberately attempt to steer clear of their
religious commitments when rendering decisions.2Y In this regard, Judge
Buckley, The Catholic Public Servant, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 1992, at 20; (2) a judge's reasoning
or rhetorical style, compare George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia,
99 YALE LJ. 1297 (1990), with Donald L. Beschle, Catechism of Imagination: Is Justice
Scalia's Judicial Style Typically Catholic?, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1329 (1992); (3) a judge's
assessment of evidentiary admissibility, see MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO,
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 916-17 (1996) (discussing State v. Lafferty,
749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988)); (4) a judge's conception about the rationality or irrationality of
religious belief itself, see Michael Ariens, Evidence of Religion and the Religion of Evidence,
40 BUFF. L. REV. 65, 105-10 (1992); or (5) a judge's determination of legal or constitutional
facts, see Thomas C. Berg & William G. Ross, Some Religiously Devout Justices: Historical
Notes and Comments, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 383, 404 (1998). Cf. also SANFORD LEVINSON,
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 27-53 (1988) (analyzing the notion that approaches to
constitutional interpretation may be considered "Protestant" or "Catholic" in nature by
virtue of their relative emphasis on text, tradition, and so forth).
21. Religious values may function subclinically for several reasons. First, even the
judge who has no fundamental objection to permitting his religious values to influence his
decisionmaking may nevertheless have ample prudential reason to refrain from overtly doing
so, especially when more conventional sources of authority would appear sufficient. See infra
Part II.D. Second, though religious values may amount to unavoidable influences,
nevertheless they may not be strong influences, especially in comparison to other variables
affecting a judge's decisionmaking. See Berg & Ross, supra note 20, at 384 ("Even if the
legal realists were right that decisions usually rest on factors other than legal doctrines, the
justices' religious beliefs may be less important than are considerations of political opinion,
social class, or geographical background. Or religion may be intertwined with these factors
in ways that are very difficult to sort out.").
22. It is interesting to contrast the American experience, wherein underdeterminacy
and the consequent need for judges to resort to extra-positive law sources are seen as
problematic, with the situation in Israel, among other jurisdictions. In particular, Israeli law
includes the Foundations of Law Act of 1980, which provides: "Where a court finds that a
question requiring a decision cannot be answered by reference to an enactment or a judicial
precedent or by way of analogy, it shall decide the same in the light of the principles of
freedom, justice, equity and peace of the heritage of Israel." Foundations of Law Act, 5740-
1980, reprinted in Daniel Sinclair, Jewish Law in the State of Israel, in AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE HISTORY AND SOURCES OF JEWISH LAW 397, 411 (N.S. Hecht et al. eds., 1996). The
Israeli Supreme Court, in turn, has relied upon the Act to refer directly to Jewish Law in
certain cases, particularly those of ethical significance. See id. at 413-15; see also Netty C.
Cross, In the Tradition of Justice, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 21, 1994, at 4.
23. See GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 144 ("[F]undamental beliefs will influence
decision even when judges conscientiously try to exclude them. In this respect, religiously
grounded beliefs are not qualitatively different from other beliefs; deeply held religious
convictions will sometimes have an influence on judgment."). Professor Daniel Conkle
provides three examples of judges who, though religious, would consider it improper to
permit their religious values to influence their decisionmaking: (1) the strict legal positivist,
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Griffen goes so far as to suggest that "[r]ather than suspecting the
reasoning of the judge who honestly includes her religious values in [the
decisional] process, we should suspect the judge who maintains that he
is being intellectually honest about judicial decision-making devoid of
religious values that he professes to hold."24
Although there is relatively little in the way of statistically sound
analysis of the relationship between religion and judging (perhaps
because of inherent definitional or methodological difficulties),
nevertheless there are studies correlating religious affiliation with
judicial decisions, at least in certain types of cases.2 The anecdotal
evidence as well would appear to support the idea that, in general, it is
often a necessary relationship where the judge is herself religious-and,
I might add, sufficiently cognizant and candid. Such evidence would
include both extrajudicial statements concerning that relationship and
who believes that all disputes should be, and can be, resolved by conventional legal sources;
(2) the judge who believes that reference to his religious values would violate the First
Amendment Establishment Clause; and (3) the judge who believes that reference to her
religious values would violate her own religious dictates insofar as such reference could
transgress the religious voluntarism of others. See Conkle, supra note 3, at 525-28. Although
these judges may readily avoid the appearance of such reference (e.g., by writing a
thoroughly formalistic or secular opinion), it is doubtful whether they may genuinely avoid
reliance on religious values altogether, given the fairly conventional notion that religious
commitments are the sort that one does not simply remove like one's overcoat. See
GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 144. Thus, for example, it is difficult to reconcile Justice
Thomas's assertion that religious faith is important and that religious persons "cannot turn
[their] backs on the essence of [their] current sanity and well-being" with the proposition that
he does not decide cases, even in part, based on his religious beliefs. Compare "Fog of
Victimization" Hurts U.S., Thomas Says, MILWAUKEE J.-SENTINEL, May 12, 1996, at A18
(reporting that Justice Thomas "stopped short of saying that religion will influence his
Supreme Court decisions" and quoting him as stating that "[w]e don't decide cases by
referring to the Bible"), with Tony Mauro, Thomas' Higher Law, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 4,
1995, at 8 (relating a Washington Times column discussing Justice Thomas's private
disclosures that he follows "God's Law" in at least some of his decisionmaking). See also
Berg & Ross, supra note 20, at 401 (noting discontinuity between the devoutness of Justices
Scalia and Thomas and their disavowal of reliance on religious values in their
decisionmaking). For an example of the formalist perspective, see Buckley, supra note 20
(arguing, as a judge, that religious or moral values should not influence judicial
decisionmaking); and cf. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[A]s judges we are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic
nor agnostic. We owe equal attachment to the Constitution and are equally bound by our
judicial obligations whether we derive our citizenship from the earliest or the latest
immigrants to these shores. As a member of this Court I am not justified in writing my
private notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish them or
how mischievous I may deem their disregard.").
24. Griffen, supra note 1, at 516.
25. See GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 144.
26. See Rick Bragg, A Sixth Sense and Sensibility, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1996, at A18
1998]
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judicial decisions explicitly referring to religion,' and may even include
the empirical speculations of academic? and other legal
commentators. 29 Of course, even if this hypothesis is fully accurate,
there should be hesitation about considering it in anything more than
general terms. For example, to presume in any given instance to know
that a judge's religiosity will affect her decisionmaking, and on that
basis to seek or justify the judge's recusal, would probably be
empirically indefensible,0  if not also constitutionally suspect,
31
(reporting, with regard to Alabama state circuit judge Tony Cothren, "that his Christian
upbringing and strong belief in God help him make his decisions on the bench. 'I understand
the differences between my personal beliefs and what the law says I can do,' he said. But his
faith helps him see more clearly right and wrong, he said, in a time when spin and half-truths
seem to rule courtrooms."); Raul A. Gonzalez, Climbing the Ladder of Success-My Spiritual
Journey, 27 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 1139, 1147-56 (1996) (cataloguing several cases in which his
religious beliefs apparently were influential); Gottschall, supra note 18, at 533 (explaining
that beliefs of a religious nature "are part of a stew of factors that unavoidably underlie my
decisions"); Griffen, supra note 1. See also supra note 23 (contrasting Justice Thomas's
public stance, that religion does not influence his decisionmaking, with his apparent private
disclosures, that it does). But see Tom Jackman, High Court Justice's Speech Revisits Society's
Treatment of Catholics, KANSAS CITY STAR, Oct. 3, 1996, at C4 (quoting Justice Scalia as
saying that "I do not think it is proper for the religious views of a judge to influence his
decisions from the bench... . The only aspect of my Catholic upbringing that I believe, and
hope, affects my work as a judge is I believe it is wrong to lie."); Sanford Levinson, The
Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1047, 1049, 1062-65 (1990) (setting forth positions of then-Supreme Court nominees
William Brennan, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy, each disavowing the influence of
their Catholic faith upon their decisionmaking, and concluding that "Justices identified with
Catholicism have been forced to proclaim the practical meaninglessness of that
identification").
27. See Ashburn, supra note 17, at 295; Idleman, supra note 2, at 475-77 & nn.145-56.
28. See Jonathan Edward Maire, The Possibility of a Christian Jurisprudence, 40 AM. J.
JURIS. 101, 103-04 (1995) ("[T]he process we call 'adjudication,' which encompasses not only
the judge's decisional processes, but the arguments of lawyers that urge a particular decision,
inevitably proceeds in a moral context, and ... this moral context just as inevitably entails
deployment, tacitly if not explicitly, of the religious convictions of the judge."); cf. generally
Mark B. Greenlee, Echoes of the Love Command in the Halls of Justice, 12 J.L. & RELIGION
255 (1996).
29. Compare Richard Carelli, Justices' Faith Can Influence Entire Nation, NEv
ORLEANS-TIMES PICAYUNE, Jan. 25, 1997, at A18 (quoting Brent Walker of the Baptist
Joint Committee: "A justice's religious views are part of the decision-making process. It
happens all the time. Judges come into the process with religious convictions they cannot,
and probably ought not, shed.") with Joan Biskupic, Changing Faith: Protestants No Longer
Rule the High Court, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1996, at C1 (asserting that "jj]ust as justices no
longer are substantially defined in the public eye by their religious backgrounds, church
affiliation does not dictate a justice's vote").
30. See John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ.
L. REV. 303, 343-46 (1998); cf also Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4-5
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding in a discrimination suit that a judge's gender and race are not
themselves sufficient indicators of bias warranting disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 144).
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institutionally problematic,' and socially unwise.3 That said, one could
still fairly conclude that in general the decisionmaking of religious
judges will be influenced, in some way, by their religious values.
This conclusion, of course, necessarily raises additional questions.
First, in terms of gauging the degree of this influence, how important is
the particular nature or denomination of a judge's religious
commitments? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer may be mixed. On the
one hand, this aspect can clearly be significant, even determinative.
Some religious traditions essentially compel their adherents to observe
the norms of faith regardless of situational circumstances,' while others
may either offer more leeway in this regard or adhere to a theological
stance on religion and government that could preclude judicial reliance
31. See Jake Garn & Lincoln C. Oliphant, Disqualification of Federal Judges Under 28
U.S.C. § 455(a): Some Observations on and Objections to an Attempt by the United States
Department of Justice To Disqualify a Judge on the Basis of His Religion and Church
Position, 4 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 49-59 (1981) (discussing State v. Freeman, 507 F.
Supp. 706 (D. Idaho 1981)); Garvey & Coney, supra note 30, at 346-48.
32. See Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds for
Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 662, 686 (1985) ("[R]eligious
background alone should not be a proper basis for disqualification. Otherwise, a Jewish
judge, for instance, could not hear cases affecting Jewish interests, such as the
constitutionality of Sunday closing laws, nor could Catholic judges sit in cases affecting
Catholics as a group. A judge's religious background, like his race or ethnic background,
should not be presumed to affect his ability to execute his judicial duties faithfully and
impartially.").
33. As noted by the Eleventh Circuit:
The fact that an individual belongs to a minority does not render one biased or
prejudiced, or raise doubts about one's impartiality: "that one is black does not
mean, ipso facto, that he is anti-white; no more than being Jewish implies being
anti-Catholic, or being Catholic implies being anti-Protestant." ... As Judge
Higginbotham eloquently wrote:
"It would be a tragic day for the nation and the judiciary if a myopic vision of
the judge's role should prevail, a vision that required judges to refrain from
participating in their churches, in their non-political community affairs, in their
universities. So long as Jewish judges preside over matters where Jewish and
Gentile litigants disagree; so long as Protestant judges preside over matters
were Protestant and Catholic litigants disagree; so long as white judges preside
over matters where white and black litigants disagree, I will preside over
matters where black and white litigants disagree."
United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1542 (11th Cir. 1987) (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Pennsylvania v. Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp. 155, 163, 181 (E.D.
Pa. 1974)), cert denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988).
34. See, e.g., Greenlee, supra note 28, at 255 n.1 (noting that "[j]udges standing within
[the author's] own neo-Calvinist tradition would view themselves as called to apply their
religious beliefs to their judicial office and would view as religious the most basic,
nondependent beliefs of other judges, whether they are recognized as 'religious' or not, as
playing an inevitable part in their own decision making process").
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on religion altogether.35 On the other hand, if one embraces an
extremely broad definition of religion-e.g., an individual's set of
indelible first principles, or "a comprehensive way of perceiving and
understanding life and the world ... [that] affects everything",36-then
religious values may turn out to be unavoidable referents for virtually
all individuals and, as a consequence, particular denominational stances
may become considerably less significant. At best, it may be a matter of
degree.
Second, does a correlation between religious commitment and
judicial decisionmaking indicate that the evaluation of candidates or
nominees for judicial office should include consideration of their
religious beliefs or affiliations?' As Professor Sanford Levinson has
pointed out, this is a serious and potentially difficult question.38 At the
outset, it should be recognized that the federal Constitution would
appear in many instances to preclude the governmental consideration of
religious beliefs in that process, at least where they constitute an
adverse or determinative factor. 9 Yet, that prohibition neither renders
35. See Conkle, supra note 3, at 527-28.
36. Smith, supra note 18, at 215; see also Carter, supra note 16, at 940 ("The very idea of
devotion suggests a way of ordering all life and all knowledge, including, although not
exclusively, moral knowledge.").
37. Regarding whether or not religious affiliation should be used as part of the Supreme
Court appointment process, see BARBARA A. PERRY, A "REPRESENTATIVE" SUPREME
COURT? THE IMPACT OF RACE, RELIGION, AND GENDER ON APPOINTMENTS chs. 2-3, 6
(1991).
38. Regarding Catholic judicial candidates in particular, see generally Levinson, supra
note 26. For a relatively recent controversy, see John Flynn Rooney, Judicial Candidates
Won't Be Asked About Religion, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 2, 1991, at 1 (reporting that the
Chicago Council of Lawyers governing board stated that, in general, it would not inquire into
the religious beliefs of judicial candidates). For a study finding uneven treatment of judicial
candidates based on religious beliefs, see Henry R. Glick & Craig F. Emmert, Selection
Systems and Judicial Characteristics: The Recruitment of State Supreme Court Judges, 70
JUDICATURE 228 (1987).
39. At the federal level, the No Religious Test Clause could preclude such
consideration, see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."), while the Free
Exercise Clause could have comparable significance at the state level. See, e.g., McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invalidating a Tennessee state constitutional provision prohibiting
any member of the clergy from serving the state legislature); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488, 489 (1961) (invalidating a Maryland state constitutional provision requiring "a
declaration of belief in the existence of God" as a qualification for public office); Silverman
v. Campbell, 486 S.E.2d 1 (S.C. 1997) (affirming the invalidation of two South Carolina state
constitutional provisions requiring affirmation of the existence of a Supreme Being as a
qualification for public office); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)
(noting that pursuant to the First Amendment the government may not "impose special
disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status") (citing Larson v. Valente, 456
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such beliefs logically irrelevant nor precludes private entities and
individuals from urging or from independently undertaking this type of
inquiry. There may, of course, be a cultural repugnance or resistance
regarding such an inquiry, borne of our national historical experience,
that is sufficiently powerful to forestall even private inquiry into
religious beliefs.' On that basis, a candidate's religious beliefs could be
rendered out-of-bounds even though relevant and informative. In the
words of Professor Levinson, "one might ... be willing to concede that
information about a nominee's religious stance would be relevant, but
nonetheless prohibit inquiries about that stance either because of the
likely unfairness for the particular nominee or, more generally, because
of the adverse consequences for the general tone of American public
life.",41 Unfortunately, the question becomes particularly difficult when
the judicial candidate herself identifies her religious beliefs as an
important factor in her candidacy, or, perhaps, when the candidate's
religious beliefs are so very much at odds with the constitutional values
of liberty, equality, and tolerance that to overlook them would itself be
travesty far worse than the risk of religious persecution.
Having addressed the religious judge, it is also necessary to ask
about the relationship between religious values and the self-identified
nonreligious judge. As a general matter, the nature and consequence of
this relationship will turn principally on two considerations. The first of
these is, once again, the conceptualization of religion and religious
values. A broad conceptualization or formulation, such as one of those
noted above,42 could lead to the conclusion that there is in fact no such
thing as a nonreligious judge or, alternatively, that even self-identified
nonreligious judges necessarily, from time to time, rely on values or
premises that are in some sense religious. For certain observers, neither
alternative may be pleasant to contemplate, let alone accept, but given
U.S. 228, 245 (1982); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345
U.S. 67,69 (1953)).
40. Recall the criticism of Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder after his questioning then-
Judge Clarence Thomas about Thomas's Catholicism, including the potential for divided
allegiance between the Constitution and Rome as well as the doctrine of natural law. See
Donald P. Baker & David S. Broder, Wilder in Hot Water: Prelates, Politicians Angered by
Words on High Court Nominee's Catholicism, WASH. POST, July 4, 1991, at Cl; Beschle,
supra note 20, at 1329 & n.3; Robert A. Destro, The Structure of the Religious Liberty
Guarantee, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 355, 375 n.85 (1994-95). More generally, see Julia Lieblich,
Politics and Religion" When Are Questions Justified About a Candidate's Beliefs, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Oct. 30, 1994, at G4; Larry Witham, Theological Potshots Traded in
Campaigns, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1994, at Al.
41. Levinson, supra note 26, at 1074.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 10, 36.
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contemporary understandings about the nature of religion, summary
dismissal of this possibility is simply not an option.
The second consideration is the larger relationship among the
judge's worldview, the culture in which that worldview was formed and
with which it interacts, and the degree to which and ways in which this
culture reflects or embodies religious norms and beliefs. In particular,
it may be impossible for even the nonreligious judge to avoid the use of
religious values to the extent they permeate the cultural context and,
thus, his worldview. This would be especially true where the judge is
specifically contemplating the moral dimensions of a case.43 (Of course
such contemplation itself, without regard to the question of religious
values, may be controversial from some jurisprudential perspectives. 44)
Be that as it may, the fact is that even the nonreligious judge cannot
necessarily avoid reliance on religious values, though the non-conscious
nature of the reliance and the extrinsic nature of the values may render
such reliance less obvious and less problematic as a result.
Before proceeding to the question of limits, it is worth noting one
additional empirical proposition, albeit one with substantial normative
force. It is an observation not about judges per se, but rather about the
nature of many religious belief systems and the peculiar significance of
that nature for the judge's task. Specifically, the consideration of
religious values or norms, including especially their origins and
development, can have a tremendous and possibly unique humbling
influence on the disposition of judges. Many of the religious traditions
in this country are, after all, repositories for centuries of deep reflection
upon human nature, society, and ethics-in short, upon the human
condition. In turn, for a judge, in the process of reaching a decision
about human relationships or institutions, to stand in earnest before this
wealth of religious insight necessarily impresses upon him the
sophistication of his task, the fallibility of his sense of judgment, and the
significance of his fiduciary obligations. That such extratextual
contemplation could actually render judges more humble and their
decisionmaking more responsible may very well seem paradoxical to a
43. See GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 147 ("In our culture, as in most others, religion
is intertwined with our deep moral premises. Ordinarily, one can identify these premises,
such as the idea of universal human respect, without looking at religious sources; but the
sources are undoubtedly of causal significance .... ").
44. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990). For a more recent and wide-ranging critique, see ROBERT
H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN
DECLINE (1996).
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formalistic or positivistic mindset, but it is an empirical proposition that
warrants serious reflection and further undergirds the general position
set forth by Judge Griffen.
II. OPERATIVE LIMITS
No less important than the task of conceptualizing the use of
religious values in judicial decisionmaking is the task of
compartmentalizing such use--of delineating the major limits on the
substantive interrelationship between religion and the judicial process.
Judges hardly need reminding that much of their craft involves the
difficult function of line-drawing. While advocates and scholars can be
counted on to raise the principles and competing principles at stake in
any dispute, it is the authoritative articulation of limits on those
principles (and thus the authoritative reconciliation of the competing
principles) that distinguishes the art of judging from, say, a conversation
at the dinner table, let alone a "panel discussion" on the Jerry Springer
show. In contrast even to legislators, who have the luxury either to
avoid articulating limits by casting laws in general or ambiguous terms
or instead to articulate limits that represent relatively unprincipled
compromises, judges must articulate limits that stem from the processes
of reason and logic, from the principles themselves, and, of course, from
the authority of text, tradition, precedent, and the like. 5
Regarding the circumscription of religious influences in judicial
decisionmaking, one might consider at least four categories of limits-
those arising from the federal Constitution, those arising from our
unwritten or informal philosophical commitments as a politically
constituted people, those arising from the professional ethical
obligations of the judicial office, and those arising from the prudential
constraints inherent in the task of judging. As one canvasses each type
of limit, one might also consider their application to different aspects of
the judicial process: the assessment of evidence and facts, the resolution
of questions of law, the expression of that resolution in an opinion, the
formulation of remedies, and so forth.
A. Federal Constitutional Limits
Although the federal Constitution is relatively silent on matters of
45. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15-19 (1959). As Professor Greenawalt observes, "[o]f all officials,
judges are the most carefully disciplined in restraining their frame of reference."
GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 149.
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religion, it nevertheless contains several provisions or guarantees that
could limit the role of religion in the judicial decisional process. 46 Chief
among these, and those considered here, are the Establishment Clause,
the Free Exercise Clause, and the Due Process Clauses.47 It is important
to note at the outset, however, that even a colorable claim under one of
these provisions, if asserted against or in relation to a judicial officer,
may be precluded by any number of doctrines, particularly that of
judicial immunity" and, at least in federal court, that of standing.49
46. There may also be state constitutional limits-say, where a state constitutional
analog to the federal religion clauses is equally or more restrictive in a relevant way. See
generally G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REV. 73 (1989); Linda S.
Wendtland, Note, Beyond the Establishment Clause: Enforcing Separation of Church and
State Through State Constitutional Provisions, 71 VA. L. REV. 625 (1985).
47. Another possible avenue is the equal protection guarantee as applicable to the
states, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, and to the federal government, see id. amend. V;
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), but it is likely that any claim brought under this
guarantee would already be addressable under one or more of the clauses already discussed
here. Importantly, the Constitution also contains at least one provision-the No Religious
Test Clause of article VI-that may effectively serve to constrain the limits imposed by these
clauses. See supra note 39; Feminist Women's Health Center v. Codispoti, 69 F.3d 399, 400
(9th Cir. 1995) (Noonan, J.) (invoking the No Religious Test Clause to deny a recusal motion
based on the plaintiffs' claim that the judge's "fervently-held religious beliefs would
compromise [his] ability to apply the law"); Garvey & Coney, supra note 30, at 346-48
(discussing the relevance of the clause to the question of recusal). See generally Gerard V.
Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine
that Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674 (1987); Daniel L. Dreisbach, The
Constitution's Forgotten Religion Clause: Reflections on the Article VI Religious Test Ban, 38
J. CHURCH & ST. 261 (1996).
48. Judges are generally immune from suits for damages as long as they are functioning
in a judicial capacity, see Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225-28 (1988), and are acting with
minimal jurisdictional authority, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978);
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871); Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080, 1085 (11th Cir.
1996). Importantly, however, judicial immunity is generally "not a bar to prospective
injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity." Pulliam v. Allen,
466 U.S. 522,541-42 (1984).
49. Article III standing involves both constitutional and prudential requirements. See
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
750-51 (1984). While a party directly and adversely affected by a judicial ruling that rests
substantially on religious authority may very well have standing to challenge the use of such
authority on appeal or collaterally, it is unlikely that any other individual could sustain this
type of action. Cf. Suhre v. Haywood County, 131 F.3d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding,
in a challenge to the maintenance of a Ten Commandments display in the main courtroom of
a county courthouse, that a challenger must have "unwelcome direct contact with a religious
display that appears to be endorsed by the state" and that "a mere abstract objection to
unconstitutional conduct is not sufficient to confer standing"); Alabama Freethought Ass'n v.
Moore, 893 F. Supp. 1522 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (holding, in a challenge to a judge's posting of
the Ten Commandments and instigating of prayer during jury organizing sessions, that
persons not actually litigating before the judge lacked standing).
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1. The Establishment Clause
By Supreme Court interpretation, the Establishment Clause has
been held to prohibit government conduct that has the purpose of
advancing or inhibiting religion50 or that has no secular purpose at allr;
that has the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion2 or of inducing
psychological coercion 3; that fosters the excessive entanglement of
religion and governmente; or that amounts to preferentialism either
among religions or between religion and irreligion.5 Without question
these proscriptions apply to judges, both federal and state, no less than
to other governmental actors.56 In turn, they obviously have the
potential to limit the judicial use of religious values, although the
appropriate test or standard may depend on the nature of the judicial
proceeding, the manner in which the religious value is employed, and
perhaps the source and substance of the religious value.'
It does not require a great deal of imagination to suppose that a
judge's use of religious values might be driven by the purpose of
advancing religion or, alternatively, might lack a secular purpose.58 Nor
50. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997,2010 (1997).
51. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578,589-94 (1987); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,41-42 (1980).
52. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2010; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
53. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-98 (1992); cf. School Dist. of Abington Twp.,
Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). For a helpful analysis of Weisman, see Abner S.
Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 451,458-63 (1995).
54. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2015; Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126-27
(1982); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613; Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y. City, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
At least in the government aid context, the Court has recently indicated that the
entanglement inquiry may often be treated as an inquiry into effect. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct.
at 2015.
55. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703
(1994); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-
04 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
56. See Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) ("The First
Amendment applies to any application of state power, including judicial decision on a state's
common law.") (citing Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190,191 (1960)).
57. Cf., e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 147-49 (presenting and assessing four uses
of religious values that do not directly implicate a judge's own religious beliefs). Previously I
noted that "Ifor Establishment Clause purposes, ... it may be necessary to discriminate
among different judicial uses of religious values" and that "three factors may be helpful in
this process: (1) the nature of the religious value; (2) the degree to which it informs the
judge's decision making; and (3) the manner in which it is employed by the judge." Idleman,
supra note 3, at 481.
58. The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that a government action does not
violate "the Establishment Clause because it 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the
tenets of some or all religions."' Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980) (quoting
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would it be difficult to imagine that the judicial invocation of religious
values, particularly standing alone, could be considered an
"endorsement" of religion, a standard which from time-to-time has
been employed as an apparent refinement of the purpose or effect
inquiry.59 (That said, it may be debatable whether the inclusion of, say,
a scriptural citation in a judicial opinion is genuinely comparable to the
government's placement of a nativity scene on public property.)
Likewise, the judicial use of religious values could invite entanglement,
and at the very least could transgress the epistemological prohibition,
set forth in United States v. Ballard,6° on governmental assessment of the
objective validity of any given religious belief or claim.6 ' Finally, there
is always a risk-arguably a substantial risk-that judicial reference to
religious norms or authorities could be preferential among religions or
otherwise nonneutral toward religion.62
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422 (1961)); accord Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,
604 n.8 (1988); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (1983); Clayton by
Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 380-81 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081 (1990). For
criticism specifically of motivation analysis under the Establishment Clause, see Carter,
supra note 17, at 936-38.
59. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 593-
94 (1989) (holding that government action may not have the effect of perceived
endorsement); see also Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763-
68 (1995) (elaborating on, and explaining the limits of, the "so-called 'endorsement test'");
Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1360 (N.J. 1992) ("Under the
Establishment Clause, the State can neither impose religious rules nor endorse religious
norms."), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 952 (1993).
60. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
61. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (reaffirming "the prohibition
against judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs"); United Christian
Scientists v. Christian Science Bd. of Directors, First Church of Christ, Scientist, 829 F.2d
1152, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("The Establishment Clause prohibits any and all official
judgments concerning the rectitude of religious belief."); Williams v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d
910, 914 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) ("American courts have no business endorsing or
condemning the truth or falsity of anyone's religious beliefs.").
62. Consider, for example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Hadnot v. Shaw,
826 P.2d 978 (Okla. 1992), which essentially involved a claim of wrongful excommunication
within the Mormon faith. In defining the nature of religious association and the
constitutional relationship between religion and the state, the Court expressly and
exclusively embraced a Calvinist perspective, or at least attempted to do so. See id. at 988
("While the Constitution protects the jurisdiction of an ecclesiastical tribunal by its Free
Exercise Clause's shield, it also serves to protect the rights of an individual to worship or not
to worship according to one's conscience. Sovereign only within her own domain, the church
has no power over those who live outside of the spiritual community. The church may not be
forced to tolerate as a member one whom it feels obliged to expel from its flock. On the
other hand, no citizen of the state may be compelled to remain in a church which his
conscience impels him to leave.") (citing ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM
108 (Win. B. Eerdmans 1987) (1898-99)).
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There is, to my knowledge, no decision holding that a judge's use of
religion as a decisional factor violated the Establishment Clause.
Assertions to that effect have periodically been advanced,63 and there
are cases finding Establishment Clause violations where a judge
engaged in courtroom prayere or posted the Ten Commandments on
the courtroom wall.65 As for a direct challenge to the substantive
utilization of religious norms or authority by a judge, however, the
judiciary itself apparently, and understandably, has yet to offer a
ruling.
66
2. The Free Exercise Clause
Like the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause may also
impose limits on the judicial use of religious values, particularly in
relation to the parties to a case. Under the doctrinal regime of
Employment Division v. Smith, 7 government actions that are generally
63. See Mark Langford, Judge Denies Death Row Inmate's Request for New Hearing,
UPI, Oct. 12, 1993 (available on Lexis) (noting William Kunstler's objection to a state
judge's signature of a death warrant with a "happy face," which the judge claimed was a
symbol of his religious faith, and reporting that "Kuntsler said the use of such a symbol
showed the judge's 'born-again Christianity' and 'religious motivations,' violating the
constitutional requirement of separation of church and state").
64. North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145 (4th Cir.
1991) (holding that a judge's practice of beginning sessions with a prayer violated the
Establishment Clause), cerL denied, 505 U.S. 1219 (1992). Compare Hill v. Cox, 424 S.E.2d
201, 206-07 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (essentially side-stepping the issue by holding that a trial
judge's prayer request-that all individuals in the courtroom join him "as we invoke the
blessing of the Almighty that what we do this date might be guided by his hand and further
that what we do might be equitable to our fellow man"-amounted to harmless error).
65. See Alabama ex rel. Pryor v. ACLU of Ala., No. CV 95-919-PR (Montgomery
County Circ. Ct. Feb. 10, 1997) (holding that an Alabama trial judge's two hand-carved
plaques of the Ten Commandments, hung on the wall behind his bench and visible from any
position in the courtroom, especially from the jury box, violate the Establishment Clause of
the U.S. Constitution and the Alabama Constitution), judgment vacated and appeal dismissed
on jurisdictional grounds, Nos. 1951975, 1960572, 1960839, and 1960927, 1998 WL 21985
(Ala. Jan. 23, 1998); see also Harvey v. Cobb County, Ga., 811 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993)
(holding that the display of the Ten Commandments on a county courthouse wall violated
the Establishment Clause), aff'd, 15 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir.), cerL denied, 511 U.S. 1129 (1994);
Rick Bragg, Judge Allows God's Law To Mix with Alabama's, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1997, at
A14 (discussing the Alabama case); Derek H. Davis, Religion and the Abuse of Judicial
Power, 39 J. CHURCH & STATE 203 (1997) (critiquing the judge's conduct in the Alabama
case); Deborah Tedford, Suit Asks To Bar Commandments from Courtroom, HOUSTON
CHRON., Dec. 11, 1997, at 39 (discussing a suit recently filed by an attorney against a Texas
state court judge whose courtroom is adorned with a poster of the Ten Commandments).
66. For further analysis, especially under the Lemon test, see Idleman, supra note 2, at
481-85.
67. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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applicable and neutral towards religion are for the most part beyond the
proscriptive reach of the Free Exercise Clause.' Critical to the inquiry
in any given instance, therefore, is whether the judicial use of religious
values can be considered generally applicable and neutral. First, it is
conceivable that a judicial decision directed towards specific parties
might not be considered a generally applicable government action,
though the law applied would presumably be. Second, it is also
conceivable, as noted under the Establishment Clause discussion, that a
judge may employ religious values in a way that is not neutral towards
religion, though such use may nonetheless be neutral towards the
religious liberty of the claimant.69 Obviously these are case-specific
inquiries that will turn on the allegations and circumstances of each
controversy.
3. The Due Process Clauses
Yet another constitutional guarantee that could limit the use of
religious values is that of due process.0 At least three due process
concerns present themselves: (1) whether decisionmaking grounded in
religious values or authority can be said to exhibit a rational basis or a
legitimate government purpose, (2) whether such decisionmaking
provides adequate notice to affected parties, and (3) whether such
68. Exceptions to this general rule include cases involving so-called hybrid claims where
the party has alleged a constitutional right in tandem with the free exercise right, see id. at
881-82, and in cases involving the denial of unemployment compensation benefits, see id. at
883-84, although the latter exception may be nothing more than an instance of where the law
is not actually generally applicable. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2161
(1997). It is conceivable that the former exception may be applicable where a party's right to
due process or court access, along with the party's free exercise, is somehow infringed by the
judicial use of religious values, but the scope and rationale of the hybrid claim concept are
murky. See generally Bertrand Fry, Note, Breeding Constitutional Doctrine: The Provenance
and Progeny of the "Hybrid Situation" in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 833 (1993); James R. Mason, III, Comment, Smith's Free-Exercise "Hybrids" Rooted in
Non-Free-Exercise Soil, 6 REGENT U. L. REv. 201 (1995).
69. Cf. Muhammad v. Muhammad, 622 So. 2d 1239, 1248 (Miss. 1993) (concluding that
a trial judge's (chancellor's) outright disagreement with the substance of a party's religious
beliefs, which were considered as part of a child custody determination, was inappropriate
and "served ... only to expose a view held by the chancellor that in ordinary circumstances
would be present but tacit" and that reversal was not warranted because "[hie was careful to
point out in the opinion and in several later stages of the proceedings that religious doctrine
and beliefs in and of themselves would play no part in his decision"), cert denied, 510 U.S.
1047 (1994).
70. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing, as interpreted, that the federal government
shall not deprive any person "of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); id.
amend. XIV (providing, as interpreted, that state and local governments shall not "deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
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decisionmaking deprives the parties of an impartial or unbiased
adjudicative forum.
First there is the rational basis analysis, which is the baseline level of
constitutional scrutiny for all government actions, including judicial
decisions. While there is obviously an institutional disincentive among
judges to subject each other's decisions to the type of rationality review
to which they subject every other branch or agent of government, there
is no theoretical or jurisprudential bar to such scrutiny. What is
particularly interesting about this prospect is that the "rationality"-
really, the acceptability under a rational basis analysis-of what one
might call pure moral justifications for government actions is somewhat
uncertain at present.7 In turn, the viability of religious justifications
within the context of judicial decisionmaking might be jeopardized as
well.
In a key passage in Bowers v. Hardwick,' the Supreme Court
remarked that
[t]he law ... is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all
laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated
under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy
indeed. [The respondent] insists that majority sentiments about
the morality of homosexuality should be declared inadequate.
We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of
some 25 States should be invalidated on that basis.73
The concern here is that the Bowers Court's acceptance of a pure moral
justification as a legitimate government interest, and hence the
acceptance of it as part of the rational basis equation, may become
increasingly less authoritative in the years to come. To the extent
71. By "pure moral justification" I mean a justification that does not rely on temporal,
material consequences (perhaps in the Millian tradition), but rather looks to metaphysical or
abstract notions of ethics, whether deontological or perhaps teleological. The notion that
certain conduct might be "malum in se" is congruent with the concept of pure moral
justifications, as are many religious ethical mandates. Even some arguments that appear
materially consequentialist-e.g., homosexuality should be prohibited because it will
undermine the social order-tend actually to rest on pure moral justifications-Le., that the
social order as it is presently constituted is ethically good or desirable.
72. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
73. Id. at 196; see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality
opinion) (reaffirming the legitimacy of government interests in morality in the context of
upholding a public indecency statute) (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196; Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973)).
74. The notion that a pure moral justification may not be sufficient as a matter of due
process was advanced several years ago in Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The
Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 391, 402-07 (1963). Indeed, Professor Henkin
articulated the issue not only as one of due process, but ultimately, in many instances, as one
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Romer v. Evans,75 for example, was in part about the illegitimacy of
popular or governmental nonacceptance of homosexuality on moral
grounds-which is one plausible reading of the opion76-the Bowers
principle is indeed called into serious question."7 And to the extent that
judicial decisions rest in part or in whole on religious justifications, their
ability to satisfy the rational basis test could become gradually
diminished.8
In addition to mandating that government actions exhibit a rational
basis, "[d]ue process requires people to have notice of what the law
requires of them so that they may obey it and avoid its sanctions.... [I]f
access to the law is limited, then the people will or may be unable to
learn of its requirements and may be thereby deprived of the notice to
of the prohibition against the establishment of religion. See id. at 407-11.
It is time to begin to examine-if only in order to justify-the right of constitutional
government to legislate morality which has no secular, utilitarian, or social purpose.
It is time to attempt to define and articulate the extent to which the religious
antecedents of our values may continue to motivate our governments in the
enactment and enforcement of law."
Id at 414. The question today, of course, is whether Professor Henkin's is an idea whose
time has in fact come-and, if so, what limits this will place on the relationship between
religion and judging.
75. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
76. See id. at 1629-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850,
852, 859, 860, 864 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (invalidating under the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment the military's so-called "don't ask, don't tell" policy, 10 U.S.C. § 654,
concluding that "[i]mplicit in th[e] holding" of Romer "is a determination that ...
discrimination [against homosexuals], without more, is either inherently irrational or
invidious" and that the disparate treatment of homosexuals under 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) was
based on nothing more than "private" or "subjective" or "irrational prejudice") (repeatedly
citing Romer, 117 S. Ct. at 1627). See also Larry Cati Backer, Reading Entrails: Romer,
VMI, and the Art of Divining Equal Protection, 32 TULSA L.J. 361, 387 (1997) ("llt is
difficult to escape the conclusion that there is no rational relationship between the
criminalization of private, adult consensual homosexual activity and any legitimate state
policy, if such professed policies are subject to the kind of strict-rational-basis-scrutiny
exercised in Romer. This is especially so if we understand broadly the Court's admonition
that moral disapproval, disapproval of a lifestyle that is distasteful, is insufficient as a basis
for legislation which negatively impacts the target."). For an argument that Romer did not
necessarily undermine this aspect of Bowers, see Richard F. Duncan, Wigstock and the
Kulturkampf" Supreme Court Storytelling, the Culture War, and Romer v. Evans, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 345,350-52 (1997).
77. In this regard, see also Smith, supra note 18, at 206 (relating a leading constitutional
scholar's assertion that laws criminalizing consensual adult homosexual conduct could not
possibly pass a rational basis test because such laws, in that scholar's view, are grounded in
religious belief and because religious belief cannot provide a legitimate basis for law).
78. For a discussion of the marginalization of religion as irrational within the context of
legal progressivism, see Ariens, supra note 20, at 77-78. For a general overview of the notion
of permissible government objectives, see ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL
CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 96-97 (1989).
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which due process entitles them."79 In this regard, the use of religious
values in the context of judicial decisionmaking can be especially
problematic if the religious values are employed normatively or
authoritatively but, as would likely be the case, are not found as part of
the formal law of the jurisdiction. It is true, of course, that judges often
advert to principles and customs that are not always evident from the
extant legal landscape, whether or not they purport to be engaged in
common law reasoning. But it is questionable whether religious
values-as religious values and not simply generic data-are of the
same order as these principles and customs, either in terms of their
intrinsic nature or in terms of their influence on the judge's
decisionmaking. If not, then their use could be seen as problematic
from the standpoint of notice, although the prospect of a party litigating
and prevailing on such a ground does seem rather remote.
Lastly, due process requires that one have access to an impartial or
unbiased adjudicative forum. Insofar as religious values are perceived
as personal biases on the judge's part, their invocation by the judge may
violate this aspect of due process. Consider in this respect the decision
in United States v. Bakker s which addressed a federal district judge's
remarks concerning the defendant-fallen televangelist Jim Bakker. At
sentencing, the judge declared that the defendant "had no thought
whatever about his victims and those of us who do have a religion are
ridiculed as being saps from money-grubbing preachers or priests.""' On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit, disturbed by the first-person phrase "those
of us," held that the judge violated due process by "tak[ing] his own
religious characteristics into account in sentencing. "2 According to the
court:
Our Constitution, of course, does not require a person to
surrender his or her religious beliefs upon the assumption of
judicial office. Courts, however, cannot sanction sentencing
procedures that create the perception of the bench as a pulpit
from which judges announce their personal sense of religiosity
and simultaneously punish defendants for offending it. Whether
or not the trial judge has a religion is irrelevant for purposes of
79. Building Officials & Code Adm'rs v. Code Technology, Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734 (1st
Cir. 1980). See generally Joseph E. Murphy, The Duty of the Government To Make the Law
Known, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 255 (1982).
80. 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991)






To what extent does Bakker speak to the constitutionality of using
religious values? On the one hand, the judge's error was not the
influence of his own religious values per se, but rather the influence of
his own religiousness. (Had the judge adverted generally to the adverse
effects of Bakker's conduct on religion or religious adherents at large, it
appears, from the opinion at least, as if no due process violation would
have occurred.) Thus the case could be altogether irrelevant. On the
other hand, at some point one's religious values and one's religiousness
may be indistinguishable, and it is not clear, in this regard, that the
Fourth Circuit would have been less troubled had the judge stated that
Bakker's conduct was especially grievous because it violated the judge's
own understanding of Christian morality.
B. Philosophical and Jurisprudential Limits
Various commentators, such as Kent Greenawalt and Michael
Perry, have proposed that judges also ought to conform their
decisionmaking to certain philosophical or jurisprudential norms
associated with the American political and legal order." Several of
these proposals are fairly conventional and have no unique relevance to
religion, while others have been developed or refined specifically to
address the relationship between religion and law. At bottom, however,
all of them can be conceptualized as limits on the ability of judges to
employ religious values or reasoning in the decisional process.
One such proposed limit is that religious values may be used only
when more conventional legal authority is partially or fully
indeterminate, 5 and relatedly they should not be used either as the
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 141-50; MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN
POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 102-04 (1997).
85. See GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 149 (maintaining that "on exceptional
occasions the indecisiveness of legal and public reasons will be sufficiently apparent to allow
a judge to make a self-conscious use of personal convictions"); PERRY, supra note 84, at 102-
04 (condoning judicial reliance on religious premises where both the relevant law and the
relevant public values are underdeterminate). One commentator, in a carefully peer-
reviewed periodical read mostly for its articles, appears to suggest that religious norms are
inherently external to the law, although certain nonreligious moral norms are not, and that
this is why judicial reliance on religious values or authority would be improper or
unconstitutional. See David Barringer, Holier than Law, PLAYBOY, May 1997, at 49, 50
("Judges are expected to be moral agents. But they must be moral agents within the
authority of the law. They invite a new era of religious justice when they rely on external
authority, whether it be Moses, Muhammad or Mammon.").
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leading justification or as the exclusive justification (i.e., without a
parallel secular justification)Y More generally, some have proposed
that religious values can only be used if they involve reasoning that is
accessible or available on a broad scale, or if they involve sources of
authority which, in the words of Professor Daniel Conkle, can "be
tested and put in conversation with competing sources."" As one
commentator recently expressed the idea:
While other citizens have an absolute freedom to make decisions
according to their religious principles, judges are required to
base their judicial decisions primarily upon legal precedent and
established legal principles. This is not to say that a judge's
personal convictions and beliefs will not enter the judicial
decision-making process at all (it would be impossible to wholly
eradicate personal belief or bias), but a judge should not let his
religious beliefs be the primary guiding force behind his
decision.... [J]udges should decide cases on bases available to
all; only when the pool of common resources is lacking should
they permit their personal moral and religious convictions to
enter the decision-making process."
Relatedly, it has been suggested that when religious values or
authorities are employed, they should not necessarily appear in a
judge's written opinion, again because of concerns about their
accessibility or availability. + A final possible limit, one based more on
86. See Carter, supra note 16, at 943 ("[W]e ought to be uncomfortable with the idea
that the religiously devout judge will proceed at once to her religious values-but only for the
same reasons that we ought to be uncomfortable with the idea that any judge will proceed at
once to her own values.").
87. See PERRY, supra note 84, at 103 ("The nonestablishment norm forbids-properly
forbids, in my view-government, including the judicial branch, to rely on a religious premise
in making a choice if no plausible secular premise supports the choice. If a plausible secular
premise does support the choice, however, government, including the judicial branch, may
rely on a religious premise.") (footnote omitted); id. at 157 n.150 (reiterating the same
point); Griffen, supra note 1, at 519-20 ("The devout judge may not, and should not,
substitute religious conviction for judicial analysis when existing legal material is at hand....
The devout judge who relies on religious conviction as the sole basis for judicial decision-
making is acting as a prelate, not as a jurist. The judge whose notion of justice includes a
sensitivity for the interplay of religious and other values in the decision-making process is
reasoning judicially, even when including religious values in the reasoning.").
88. Conkle, supra note 3, at 530; see also GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 149 (favoring
"shared premises and ways of reasoning" unless genuinely unavailable). For a critique of the
accessibility requirement, see Maire, supra note 29, at 146-50.
89. Derek H. Davis, Religion and the Abuse of Judicial Power, 39 J. CHURCH & STATE
203,210-11 (1997).
90. Compare GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 150 ("Since different judges will have
different views, ... [religious] reasons would have no comfortable place in a majority
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substance than form, is that judges may advert only to those religious
values that accord with the substantive commitments of our political
system, such as liberty, equality, and toleration.9"
These proposed restrictions obviously vary in theoretical and
practical defensibility, and the more controversial ones have not gone
without challenge." Indeed, Judge Griffen's piece is itself a
counterpoint to some of these proposals. While a thorough overview of
the debate is beyond the scope of these comments, two points deserve
brief mention. First, much of the validity of these limits turns, once
again, on the definition or conceptualization of religion: the broader it
is, the more far-reaching will be the restriction, even to the point that
judicial decisionmaking could be reduced to a rhetorical formalism that
defies the very notion of reasoned judgment. Second, many of these
limits, though derived from political or legal philosophy, can also be
expressed as prudential restrictions. And although expressing them as
prudential rather than pure philosophical limitations may render them
less theoretically compelling, it may also render them less problematic
in two important respects. For one thing, they may appear less
offensive to the observer whose vision of political or legal philosophy
differs from those advocating the limits, which is significant to the
extent that these are matters on which persons of intelligence, reason,
and integrity can disagree. For another thing, prudential concerns are
characteristically left to the discretion of the decisionmaker on a case-
by-case basis, and such an arrangement-though perhaps a compromise
of principle-may for many be substantially less troubling than a
categorical rule of partial or wholesale exclusion. Taking into account
the context and circumstances of each adjudication, judges would be
empowered to employ (or not to employ) religious values as they best
see fit, presumably in a manner no different from their treatment of
other types of formal and informal authority.
opinion... . [E]ven when the opinion represents the voice of a single judge, the opinion
should symbolize the aspiration of interpersonal reason and be limited to public reasons.")
and Gottschall, supra note 18, at 534-35 (arguing that "it is inappropriate and imprudent" to
use religious sources to justify a judicial decision, largely because such justification could
preclude a "dissent[ing]" reader from "access[ing] and assent[ing] to [the decision] as fully as
anyone else") with PERRY, supra note 84, at 104 (questioning the tenability of Greenawalt's
position).
91. Cf. RONALD F. THIEMANN, RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR
DEMOCRACY (1996) (generally advocating such congruence in the assessment of religious
influences in law and politics).
92. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 16, at 940-44 (rejecting the idea that religious values can
be categorically excluded from judicial decisionmaking, in part because they cannot be
distinguished from comparable nonreligious values).
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C. Professional Ethical Limits
One might also ask whether a judge's use of religious values could
ever contravene the formalized professional ethics of the judicial office,
such that a judge might actually be disciplined for such use. While it is
probably fair to conclude that extrajudicial statements on religion
would in general not violate such rules," the invocation of religion or
religious authority in judicial decisionmaking or in a written judicial
opinion may present a more difficult issue. Principally this is because
the processes of decisionmaking and reasoning are so central to the
essence of the judicial task.
At first blush, this centrality might appear to favor regulation in
order to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. After all, how
better to protect this process than to safeguard its core components? It
is arguably because of this centrality, however, that resort to regulatory
and disciplinary measures could be problematic insofar as they might
constitute a direct attack on judicial independence. The substance and
structure of judicial decisions, though not without any constraints, are
by and large the domain of the judge, and the legal system-the
judiciary itself in many instances, not surprisingly-has gone to great
lengths to shield the judicial decisional process from untoward
encroachments. Hence, judges are generally immune from liability for
conduct undertaken in their judicial capacity, no matter how egregious
such conduct may seem." And under the separation-of-powers
93. See Michael Stokes Paulsen & Steffen N. Johnson, Scalia's Sermonette, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 863, 870-76 (1997) (concluding that Justice Scalia violated no such rules in his
April 9,1996, talk at a prayer breakfast, sponsored by the Christian Legal Society and held at
the First Baptist Church in Jackson, Mississippi, in which he defended the intellectual
integrity of the Christian faith). This is not to say that there are not general limits on the
extrajudicial speech of judicial candidates, and that these limits might not incidentally impact
a candidate's ability to speak on religion. See generally Talbot D'Alemberte, Searching for
the Limits of Judicial Free Speech, 61 TUL. L. REV. 611 (1987); Leonard E. Gross, Judicial
Speech: Discipline and the First Amendment, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1181 (1986); Symposium,
The Sound of the GaveL" Perspectives on Judicial Speech, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 795 (1995).
Nor is it to say that there are not prudential limits on extrajudicial speech involving religious
matters. It is not clear, for example, that a municipal judge in Cincinnati who claims to have
seen the image of Christ "every day ... in the swirls of a smooth marble pillar on the second
floor of the Hamilton County Courthouse," see Judge Sees Christ's Face on Court Pillar, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 31, 1994, at A7, should necessarily make public this
information, as it might call the objectivity or impartiality of the local judiciary into question,
whether or not it is true.
94. See Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam) ("This immunity
applies no matter how erroneous the act may have been, how injurious its consequences, how
informal the proceeding, or how malicious the motive.") (citing Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474
U.S. 193, 199-200 (1985)).
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doctrine, the legislative branch is generally precluded from interfering
with the essential aspects of the federal judicial process. 5 It follows
from this tradition that disciplinary interference with the methodology
and substantive aspects of a judge's decisionmaking should be viewed,
at the very least, as an extraordinary device, and it is doubtful whether a
judge's use of religion is so special that it alone should be capable of
triggering this device.96
To be sure, there may be instances where a judge should be
vulnerable to professional discipline for his use (or misuse) of religion,
e.g., where such use jeopardizes the apparent impartiality of his office
or manifests a thorough disregard for the rule of law. Thus, a New
York judge was admonished by the State Commission on Judicial
Conduct for criticizing a Jewish mother who sought custody of her
children on Christmas Eve and Christmas Day, because the criticism
"gave the appearance that his decision was based on his views that a
Jewish family should not observe Christmas." 7  And a judge in
Minnesota was reprimanded by that state's Board on Judicial Standards
after explaining to a man charged with animal abandonment (whom he
fined only one dollar) that "God ordained the killing of animals" and
that God "himself killed animals to provide skins for Adam and Eve
after they sinned."98 But it is important to note that the actionable
transgressions in these cases were not the judicial reliances on religion
per se, but rather the accompanying abdication of impartiality and
95. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995) (citations
omitted) (holding that the Court will not "give effect to a statute that was said '[t]o prescribe
rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before it"';
that "Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the
Executive Branch"; and that the federal judiciary has "the power, not merely to rule on
cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III
hierarchy-with an understanding, in short, that 'a judgment conclusively resolves the case'
because 'a 'judicial Power' is one to render dispositive judgments').
96For an enlightening discussion of the tension between the need to protect the
independence of judicial decisionmaking and the need to prevent the possible judicial misuse
of religion, see In re Quirk, No. 97-0-1143, 1997 WL 765985, at **4-**8 (La. Dec. 12, 1997)
(refusing to impose discipline on a judge who repeatedly sentenced misdemeanor offenders
to church attendance as a condition of probation-even though such sentencing might have
violated the religion guarantees of the U.S. and Louisiana Constitutions and allegedly
transgressed Canons 2A, 3A(1), and 3A(4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct-because doing
so in the absence of a clear violation of these constitutional provisions would unduly
undermine judicial independence as embodied in Canon 1 of the Code).
97. See Martin Fox, Religious Remarks by Nassau Judge Draw Judicial Panel's
Admonition, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 2, 1992, at 1.
98. See Judge Reprimanded for Religious Statements, WASH. TIMES, June 28, 1991, at
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effective repudiation of positive law, respectively." Absent such
transgressions, the use of religion in a judicial decision, in and of itself,
should arguably not be the target of professional disciplinary action, or
at least no more so than should a judge's use of comparable secular
norms or authority.
D. Prudential Limits
Were there no constitutional, philosophical, or professional barriers
to the outright use of religious values by judges, there would doubtless
remain various limits stemming from the judicial virtue of prudence. As
a general matter, a reputation of judicial excellence is rarely gained by
one who, no matter how intellectually and rhetorically gifted, does not
also possess an appreciation of the prudential parameters of his office.
To the extent these parameters, though not found in any code or
regulation, guide and constrain the conduct and decisionmaking of
judges, they ought to be considered as they might limit the role of
religion in the judicial process.
Addressed here rather briefly will be three prudential limits,
expressed in the form of affirmative requirements-those of
competency, efficacy, and clarity. First, a judge should invoke religious
values only to the extent that he is competent to do so." Although this
rule ought to apply whether or not the religious values are made explicit
through a written opinion, arguably their written expression does
demand greater circumspection. Given its transcendent significance
and rhetorical force, a judicial assertion that is explicitly informed by
religion should be made cautiously and carefully, with unusual regard
for the possibility of error. This is especially true, one might suppose,
with regard to decisions that involve potentially extraordinary
99. A more recent example of a judge abandoning positive law in favor of religious
norms is United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), in which a federal district
judge acquitted two abortion protesters from criminal contempt charges in part because of
"the prerogative of leniency which a fact-finder has to refuse to convict a defendant, even if
the circumstances would otherwise be sufficient to convict." Id. at 171. Though he avoided
expressly grounding the decision in terms of religion and natural law as such-a basis
explicitly advocated by the defendants, see United States v. Lynch, 104 F.3d 357 (2d Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1436 (1997)-Judge Sprizzo did invoke essentially (and at
length) the tradition of higher law, including moral opposition to American slavery, to the
Nazi regime, and to human rights violations in Bosnia. See Lynch, 952 F. Supp. at 170-72 &
nn.3-4. For commentary, see John C. Klotz, Abortion Decision Undercuts Rule of Law,
NAT'L LJ., Feb. 24, 1997, at A23; Michael W. McConnell, Breaking the Law, Bending the
Law, FIRST THINGS, June-July 1997, at 13.
100. See Idleman, supra note 2, at 485-86 (explaining why a concern about competence
should not bar the judicial use of religious values altogether).
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consequences, such as those concerning life-and-death issues.'1
Second, a judge should guard against the deployment of religion or
religious authority in the judicial opinion when such deployment would,
for whatever reason, be inefficacious. '02 Needless to say, this is good
advice as to any form of authority that could be included in a judicial
decision. As with competence, however, it is especially relevant to
religious references given their potential potency and the attendant risk
that such invocations might consequently undermine the persuasiveness
of the remainder of the decision. Not only that, but the gratuitous or
excessive use of religion in judicial decisions is, perhaps paradoxically,
one sure way of diluting the peculiar force of religious values or
symbolism in cases where they are relevant or otherwise compelling.
To the extent, in fact, that religious norms in a judicial decision can be
the juridical equivalent of dropping an atomic bomb-if effective, they
are surely more powerful than run-of-the-mill temporal authority-
prudence dictates that such norms be sparingly and strategically
deployed.
Third and lastly, a judge should use religious values only to the
extent he can explain their inclusion and significance with clarity. Like
efficacy, clarity of reasoning is not a novel requirement in the drafting
of judicial opinions," but again the special nature and authority of
religious values may warrant its emphasis when such values are
employed. One might consider in this regard the decision of the
Pennsylvania Superior Court in Wikoski v. Wikoski,' 4 which addressed
a claimant's assertion that the state statutory provision for no-fault
divorce violated his religious liberty under article I, section 3, of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. In holding against the claimant, the court in
typical fashion reviewed the case law of Pennsylvania and several other
jurisdictions. At the close of its opinion, however, the court then stated
101. See, e.g., Daniel A. Rudolph, Note, The Misguided Reliance in American
Jurisprudence on Jewish Law To Support the Moral Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 33
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 437,439-40 & nn.19-21,460-61 (1996).
102. See Maire, supra note 28, at 133 (questioning the utility or efficacy of citing
Scripture in a judicial opinion, at least in a legalistic way, as part of a judge's use of religious
values). "Such citations may in a given case be apt, but an inordinate reliance upon the
'rules' of Scripture has proved to be no more fruitful in moral discourse than has the reliance
upon the 'rules' of law by the legal positivists proved fruitful in legal discourse." Id.
Elsewhere I have argued that the omission of relevant but inefficacious or redundant legal
authority may be a justifiable judicial practice, despite a possible resulting loss of candor. See
Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1383-84
(1995).
103. See Newman, supra note 17, at 212-13.
104. 513 A.2d 986 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
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that, while it hoped the claimant would be persuaded by its analysis thus
far, "[i]f not, then we believe that the only authority best understood by
[the claimant] ... is to quote scripture. 105 And quote scripture it did,
reprinting in full the render-to-Caesar passage of Matthew 22:15-22.16
What is truly interesting for our purposes is that the court then included
in a footnote the following disclaimer: "It is not intended that the above
quote from scripture be a legally binding precedent of this Court."'"°
Whether or not the court's handling of scripture was competent or its
use of scripture necessary, what is significant here is that the court at
least attempted to make clear that, first, its citation was largely for a
party's benefit and, second, the passage itself does not have
independent precedential force within the jurisdiction-though of
course one may still wonder exactly what legal value it does possess.
III. CONCLUSION
The judicial use of religious values will never be free from concern
or criticism, even among those who do not find it categorically
objectionable. This is attributable in part to widespread antecedent
disagreement about the concepts and processes involved, and in part to
prospective wariness about the limits of such use. Judge Griffen, in this
author's opinion, has ably defended the inclusion of religious influences
in judicial decisionmaking as a general matter, and these comments
have simply attempted to discern the foundational aspects and
functional limits of his position. How far judges themselves are willing
to go, either in terms of explicitly referencing religious values in their
decisionmaking (where such values are influential) or in terms of
recognizing formal limits on the use and articulation of such values, is
not certain, and plainly there are prudential and institutional reasons
why judges might not pursue either practice with much vigor."° Be that
as it may, these are important matters for judicial and academic
discussion, and one hopes that Judge Griffen's presentation and the
symposium at which it was delivered are merely the beginning, and not
the end, of this discussion.
105. Id. at 989.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 989 n.7.
108. In this regard, Judge Griffen's presentation is not only enlightening for its
substance, but extraordinarily significant for its candor and its self-reflectiveness.
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